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Abstract
We show that learning algorithms satisfying a low approximate regret property experience
fast convergence to approximate optimality in a large class of repeated games. Our property,
which simply requires that each learner has small regret compared to a (1 + ǫ)-multiplicative
approximation to the best action in hindsight, is ubiquitous among learning algorithms; it
is satisfied even by the vanilla Hedge forecaster. Our results improve upon recent work
of Syrgkanis et al. [SALS15] in a number of ways. We require only that players observe
payoffs under other players’ realized actions, as opposed to expected payoffs. We further show
that convergence occurs with high probability, and show convergence under bandit feedback.
Finally, we improve upon the speed of convergence by a factor of n, the number of players.
Both the scope of settings and the class of algorithms for which our analysis provides fast
convergence are considerably broader than in previous work.
Our framework applies to dynamic population games via a low approximate regret property
for shifting experts. Here we strengthen the results of Lykouris et al. [LST16] in two ways:
We allow players to select learning algorithms from a larger class, which includes a minor
variant of the basic Hedge algorithm, andwe increase the maximum churn in players for which
approximate optimality is achieved.
In the bandit setting we present a new algorithm which provides a “small loss”-type bound
with improved dependence on the number of actions in utility settings, and is both simple and
efficient. This result may be of independent interest.
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1 Introduction
Consider players repeatedly playing a game, all acting independently to minimize their cost or
maximize their utility. It is natural in this setting for each player to use a learning algorithm that
guarantees small regret to decide on their strategy, as the environment is constantly changing due
to each player’s choice of strategy. It is well known that such decentralized no-regret dynamics are
guaranteed to converge to a formof equilibriumfor the game. Furthermore, in a large class of games
known as smooth games [Rou15] they converge to outcomes with approximately optimal social
welfare matching the worst-case efficiency loss of Nash equilibria (the price of anarchy). In smooth
cost minimization games the overall cost is λ/(1 − µ) times the minimum cost, while in smooth
mechanisms [ST13] such as auctions it is λ/max(1, µ) times the maximum total utility (where λ
and µ are parameters of the smoothness condition). Examples of smooth games and mechanisms
include routing games and many forms of auction games (see e.g. [Rou15, ST13, RST16]).
The speedatwhich the gameoutcome converges to this approximately optimalwelfare is governed
by individual players’ regret bounds. There are a large number of simple regret minimization
algorithms (Hedge/Multiplicative Weights, Mirror Decent, Follow the Regularized Leader; see e.g.
[Haz16]) that guarantee that the average regret goes down as O(1/
√
T) with time T, which is tight
in adversarial settings.
Taking advantage of the fact that playing a game against opponentswho themselves are also using
regretminimization is not a truly adversarial setting, a sequence of papers [DDK15, RS13b, SALS15]
showed that by using specific learning algorithms, the dependenceonT of the convergence rate can
be improved to O(1/T) (“fast convergence”). Concretely, Syrgkanis et al. [SALS15] show that all
algorithms satisfying the so-called RVU property (Regret by Variation in Utilities), which include
Optimistic Mirror Descent [RS13b], converge at a O(1/T) rate with a fixed number of players.
One issue with the works of [DDK15, RS13b, SALS15] is that they use expected cost as their
feedback model for the players. In each round every player receives the expected cost for each
of their available actions, in expectation over the current action distributions of all other players.
This clearly represents more information than is realistically available to players in games — at
most each player sees the cost of each of their actions given the actions taken by the other players
(realized feedback). In fact, even if each player had access to the action distributions of the other
players, simply computing this expectation is generally intractable when n, the number of players,
is large.
We improve the result of [SALS15] on the convergence to approximate optimality in smooth games
in a number of different aspects. To achieve this, we relax the quality of approximation from the
bound guaranteed by smoothness. Typical smoothness bounds on the price of anarchy in auctions
are small constants, such a factor of 1.58 or 2 in item auctions. Increasing the approximation factor
by an arbitrarily small constant ǫ > 0 enables the following results:
• We show that learning algorithms obtaining fast convergence are ubiquitous.
• We improve the speed of convergence by a factor of n, the number of players.
• For all our results, players only need feedback based on realized—not expected—outcomes.
• We show that convergence occurs with high probability in most settings.
• We extend the results to show that it is enough for the players to observe realized bandit
feedback, only seeing the outcome of the action they play.
• Our results apply to settings where the set of players in the game changes over time [LST16].
We strengthen previous results by showing that a broader class of algorithms achieve ap-
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proximate efficiency under significant churn.
We achieve these results using a property we term Low Approximate Regret, which simply states
that an online learning algorithm achieves good regret against a multiplicative approximation of
the best action in hindsight. This property is satisfied by many known algorithms including even
the vanilla Hedge algorithm, as well as Optimistic Hedge [RS13a, SALS15] (via a new analysis).
The crux of our analysis technique is the simple observation that formany types of data-dependent
regret boundswe can fold part of the regret bound into the comparator term, allowing us to explore
the trade-off between additive and multiplicative approximation.
In Section 3, we show that Low Approximate Regret implies fast convergence to the social welfare
guaranteed by the price of anarchy via the smoothness property. This convergence only requires
feedback from the realized actions played by other players, not their action distribution or the
expectation over their actions. We further show that this convergence occurs with high probability
in most settings. For games with a large number of players we also improve the speed of conver-
gence. [SALS15] shows that players using Optimistic Hedge in a repeated game with n players
converge to the approximately optimal outcome guaranteed by smoothness at a rate of O(n2/T).
They also offer an analysis guaranteeingO(n/T) speed of convergence, at the expense of a constant
factor decrease in the quality of approximation (e.g., a factor of 4 in atomic congestion games with
affine congestion). We achieve the convergence bound of O(n/T) with only an arbitrarily small
loss in the approximation.
Algorithms that satisfy the Low Approximate Regret property are ubiquitous and include simple,
efficient algorithms such asHedgeandvariants. The observation that this broad class of algorithms
enjoys fast convergence in realistic settings suggests that fast convergence occurs in practice.
Comparing our work to [SALS15] with regard to feedback, Low Approximate Regret algorithms
require only realized feedback, while the analysis of the RVU property in [SALS15] requires
expected feedback. To see the contrast, consider the load balancing game introduced in [KP09]
with two players and two bins, where each player selects a bin and observes cost given by the
number of players in that bin. Initialized at the uniform distribution, any learning algorithm
with expectation feedback (e.g. those in [SALS15]) will stay at the uniform distribution forever,
because the expected cost vector distributes cost equally across the two bins. This gives low regret
under expected costs, but suppose we were interested in realized costs: The only “black box” way
to lift [SALS15] to this case would be to simply evaluate the regret bound above under realized
costs, but here players will experience Θ(1/
√
T) variation because they select bins uniformly at
random, ruining the fast convergence. Our analysis sidesteps this issue because players achieve
Low Approximate Regret with high probability.
In Section 4 we consider games where players can only observe the cost of the action they played
given the actions taken by the other players, and receive no feedback for actions not played (bandit
feedback). [RS13b] analyzed zero-sum games with bandit feedback, but assumed that players
receive expected cost over the strategies of all other players. In contrast, the Low Approximate
Regret property can be satisfied by just observing realizations, even with bandit feedback. We
propose a newbandit algorithmbased on log-barrier regularizationwith importance sampling that
guarantees fast convergence of O(d logT/ǫ) where d is the number of actions. Known techniques
would either result in a convergence rate of O(d3 logT) (e.g. adaptations of SCRiBLe [RS13a]) or
would not extend to utility maximization settings (e.g. GREEN [AAGO06]). Our technique is
of independent interest since it improves the dependence of approximate regret bounds on the
number of experts while applying to both cost minimization and utility maximization settings.
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Finally, in Section 5, we consider the dynamic population game setting of [LST16], where players enter
and leave the game over time. [LST16] showed that regret bounds for shifting experts directly
influence the rate at which players can turn over and still guarantee close to optimal solutions
on average. We show that a number of learning algorithms have the Low Approximate Regret
property in the shifting experts setting,allowingus to extend the fast convergence result todynamic
games. Such learning algorithms include a noisy version of Hedge as well as AdaNormalHedge
[LS15], which was previously studied in the dynamic setting in [LST16]. Low Approximate
Regret allows us to increase the turnover rate from the one in [LST16], while also widening and
simplifying the class of learning algorithms that players can use to guarantee the close to optimal
average welfare.
2 Repeated Games and Learning Dynamics
We consider a game G among a set of n players. Each player i has an action space Si and a cost
function costi : S1 × · · · × Sn → [0, 1] that maps an action profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) to the cost costi(s)
that player experiences1. We assume that the action space of each player has cardinality d, i.e.
|Si| = d. We let w = (w1, . . . ,wn) denote a list of probability distributions over all players’ actions,
where wi ∈ ∆(Si) and wi,x is the probability of action x ∈ Si.
The game is repeated for T rounds. At each round t each player i picks a probability distribution
wt
i
∈ ∆(Si) over actions and draws their action sti from this distribution. Depending on the game
playing environment under consideration, players will receive different types of feedback after
each round. In Sections 3 and 5 we consider feedback where at the end of the round each player
i observes the utility they would have received had they played any possible action x ∈ Si given
the actions taken by the other players. More formally let ct
i,x
= costi(x, st−i), where s
t
−i is the set of
strategies of all but the ith player at round t, and let ct
i
= (ct
i,x
)x∈Si . Note that the expected cost of
player i at round t (conditioned on the other players’ actions) is simply the inner product 〈wt
i
, ct
i
〉.
We refer to this form of feedback as realized feedback since it only depends on the realized actions st−i
sampled by the opponents; it does not directly depend on their distributions wt−i. This should be
contrasted with the expectation feedback used by [SALS15, DDK15, RS13b], where player i observes
Est−i∼wt−i [costi(x, s
t
−i)] for each x.
Sections 4 and 5 consider extensions of our repeated game model. In Section 4 we examine partial
information (“bandit”) feedback, where players observe only the cost of their own realized actions.
In Section 5 we consider a setting where the player set is evolving over time. Here we use the
dynamic population model of [LST16], where at each round t each player i is replaced (“turns
over”) with some probability p. The new player has cost function costt
i
(·) and action space St
i
which may change arbitrarily subject to certain constraints. Wewill formalize this notion later on.
Learning Dynamics We assume that players select their actions using learning algorithms satis-
fying a property we call Low Approximate Regret, which simply requires that the cumulative cost
of the learner multiplicatively approximates the cost of the best action they could have chosen in
hindsight. We will see in subsequent sections that this property is ubiquitous and leads to fast
convergence in a robust range of settings.
1See Appendix D for analogous definitions for utility maximization games.
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Definition 1. (Low Approximate Regret) A learning algorithm for player i satisfies the LowApproximate
Regret property for parameter ǫ > 0 and function A(d,T) if for all action distributions f ∈ ∆(Si),
(1 − ǫ)
T∑
t=1
〈wti , cti〉 ≤
T∑
t=1
〈 f , cti〉 +
A(d,T)
ǫ
. (1)
A learning algorithm satisfies LowApproximateRegret against shifting experts if for all sequences f 1 , . . . , fT ∈
∆(Si), letting K = |{i > 2 : f t−1 , f t}| be the number of shifts,
(1 − ǫ)
T∑
t=1
〈wti , cti〉 ≤
T∑
t=1
〈 f t, cti〉 + (1 + K)
A(d,T)
ǫ
. (2)
In the bandit feedback setting, we require (1) to hold in expectation over the realized strategies of player i for
any f ∈ ∆(Si) fixed before the game begins.
Weuse the versionof theLowApproximateRegret propertywith shifting expertswhen considering
players in dynamic population games in Section 5. In this case, the game environment is constantly
changing due to churn in the population, and we need the players to have low approximate regret
with shifting experts to guarantee high social welfare despite the churn.
We emphasize that all algorithms we are aware of that satisfy Low Approximate Regret can be
made to do so for any fixed choice of the approximation factor ǫ via an appropriate selection of
parameters. Many algorithms have an even stronger property: They satisfy (1) or (2) for all ǫ > 0
simultaneously. We say that such algorithms satisfy the Strong Low Approximate Regret property.
This property has favorable consequences in the context of repeated games.
The Low Approximate Regret property differs from previous properties such as RVU in that it
only requires that the learner’s cost be close to a multiplicative approximation to the cost of the
best action in hindsight. Subsequently, it is always smaller than the regret. For instance, if we
consider only uniform (i.e. not data-dependent) regret bounds the Hedge algorithm can only
achieve O(
√
T log d) exact regret, but can achieve LowApproximate Regret with parameters ǫ and
A(d,T) = O(log d) for any ǫ > 0. Low Approximate Regret is analogous to the notion of α-regret
from [KKL09], with α = (1 + ǫ).
In Appendix D we show that the Low Approximate Regret property and our subsequent results
naturally extend to utility maximization games.
SmoothGames It is well-known that in a large class of games, termed smooth games by Roughgar-
den [Rou15], traditional learning dynamics converge to approximately optimal social welfare. In
subsequent sections we analyze the convergence of Low Approximate Regret learning dynamics
in such smooth games. We will see that Low Approximate Regret (for sufficiently small A(d,T))
coupled with smoothness of the game implies fast convergence of learning dynamics to desirable
social welfare under a variety of conditions. Before proving this result we review social welfare
and smooth games.
For a given action profile s, the social cost is C(s) =
∑n
i=1 costi(s). To bound the efficiency loss due
to the selfish behavior of the players we define
Opt = min
so
n∑
i=1
costi(so).
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Definition 2. (Smooth game [Rou15]) A cost minimization game is called (λ, µ)-smooth if for all strategy
profiles s and s∗:
∑
i costi(s
∗
i
, s−i) ≤ λ · costi(s∗) + µ · costi(s).
This property is typically applied using a (close to) optimal action profile s∗ = so. For this case the
property implies that if s is an action profile with very high cost, then some player deviating to her
share of the optimal profile s∗
i
will improve her cost.
For smooth games, the price of anarchy is at most λ/(1 − µ), meaning that Nash equilibria of the
game, aswell as no-regret learning outcomes in the limit, have social cost atmost a factor ofλ/(1−µ)
above the optimum. Smooth costminimization games include congestiongames such as routing or
load balancing. For example, atomic congestion games with affine cost functions are (53 ,
1
3 )-smooth
[CK05], non-atomic games are (1, 0.25) smooth [RT02], implying a price of anarchy of 2.5 and 1.33
respectively. Whilewe focus on cost-minimization games for simplicity of exposition,an analogous
definition also applies for utility maximization, including smooth mechanisms [ST13], which we
elaborate on in Appendix D. Smooth mechanisms include most simple auctions. For example, the
first price item auction is (1 − 1/e, 1)-smooth and all-pay actions are (1/2, 1)-smooth, implying a
price of anarchy of 1.58 and 2 respectively. All of our results extend to such mechanisms.
3 Learning in Games with Full Information Feedback
We now analyze the efficiency of algorithms with the Low Approximate Regret property in the
full information setting. Our first proposition shows that, for smooth games with full information
feedback, learners with the Low Approximate Regret property converge to efficient outcomes.
Proposition 1. In any (λ, µ)-smooth game, if all players use LowApproximate Regret algorithms satisfying
Eq. (1) with parameters ǫ andA(d,T), then for the action profiles st drawn on round t from the corresponding
mixed actions of the players,
1
T
∑
t
E
[
C(st)
]
≤ λ
1 − µ − ǫOpt +
n
T
· 1
1 − µ − ǫ ·
A(d,T)
ǫ
.
Proof. This proof is a straightforward modification of the usual price of anarchy proof for smooth
games. We obtain the claimed bound by writing
∑
tE
[
C(st)
]
=
∑
i
∑
t E
[
costi(st)
]
, using the Low
Approximate Regret property with f = s∗
i
for each player i for the optimal solution s∗, then using
the smoothness property for each time t to bound
∑
i costi(s∗i , s
t
−i), and finally rearranging terms. 
For ǫ << (1−µ) the approximation factor ofλ/(1−µ−ǫ) is very close to the price of anarchy λ/(1−µ).
This shows that Low Approximate Regret learning dynamics quickly converge to outcomes with
social welfare arbitrarily close to the welfare guaranteed for exact Nash equilibria by the price of
anarchy. A simple corollary of this proposition is that, when players use learning algorithms that
satisfy the Strong Low Approximate Regret property, the bound above can be taken to depend on
Opt even though this value is unknown to the players.
Whenever the Low Approximate Regret property is satisfied, a high probability version of the
property with similar dependence on ǫ and A(d,T) is also satisfied. This implies that in addition
to quickly converging to efficient outcomes in expectation, Low Approximate Regret learners
experience fast convergence with high probability.
Proposition 2. In any (λ, µ)-smooth game, if all players use LowApproximate Regret algorithms satisfying
Eq. (1) for parameters ǫ and A(d,T), then for the action profile st drawn on round t from the players’ mixed
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actions and γ = 2ǫ/(1 + ǫ), we have that ∀δ > 0, with probability at least 1 − δ,
1
T
∑
t
C(st) ≤ λ
1 − µ − γOpt +
n
T
· 1
1 − µ − γ ·
[
4A(d,T)
γ
+
12 log(n log2(T)/δ))
γ
]
,
Examples of Simple LowApproximate Regret Algorithms Propositions 1 and 2 are informative
when applied with algorithms for which A(d,T) is sufficiently small. One would hope that such
algorithms are relatively simple and easy to find. We show now that the well-known Hedge
algorithm as well as basic variants such as Optimistic Hedge and Hedge with online learning rate
tuning satisfy the property with A(d,T) = O(log d), which will lead to fast convergence both in
terms of n and T. For these algorithms and indeed all that we consider in this paper, we can
achieve the Low Approximate Regret property for any fixed ǫ > 0 via an appropriate parameter
setting. In Appendix A.2, we provide full descriptions and proofs for these algorithms.
Example 1. Hedge satisfies the Low Approximate Regret property with A(d,T) = log(d). In particular one
can achieve the property for any fixed ǫ > 0 by using ǫ as the learning rate.
Example 2. Hedge with online learning rate tuning satisfies the Strong Low Approximate Regret property
with A(d,T) = O(log d).
Example 3. Optimistic Hedge satisfies the Low Approximate Regret property with A(d,T) = 8 log(d). As
with vanilla Hedge, we can choose the learning rate to achieve the property with any ǫ.
Example 4. Any algorithm satisfying a “small loss” regret bound of the form
√
(Learner’s cost) · A
or
√
(Cost of best action) · A satisfies Strong Low Approximate Regret via the AM-GM inequality, i.e.√
(Learner’s cost) · A ∝ infǫ>0[ǫ · (Learner’s cost) + A/ǫ]. In particular, this implies that the following
algorithms have Strong Low Approximate Regret: Canonical small loss and self-confident algorithms, e.g.
[FS97, ACBG02, YEYS04], Algorithm of [CBMS07], Variation MW [HK10], AEG-Path [SL14], AdaNor-
malHedge [LS15], Squint [KVE15], and Optimistic PAC-Bayes [FRS15].
Example 4 shows that the Strong Low Approximate Regret property in fact is ubiquitous, as it is
satisfied by any algorithm that provides small loss regret bounds or one of many variants on this
type of bound. Moreover, all algorithms that satisfy the Low Approximate Regret property for all
fixed ǫ can be made to satisfy the strong property using the doubling trick.
Main Result for Full Information Games:
Theorem 3. In any (λ, µ)-smooth game, if all players use Low Approximate Regret algorithms satisfying
(1) for parameter ǫ 2 and A(d,T) = O(log d), then
1
T
∑
t
E
[
C(st)
]
≤ λ
1 − µ − ǫOpt +
n
T
· 1
1 − µ − ǫ ·
O(log d)
ǫ
,
and furthermore, ∀δ > 0, with probability at least 1 − δ,
1
T
∑
t
E
[
C(st)
]
≤ λ
1 − µ − ǫOpt +
n
T
· 1
1 − µ − ǫ ·
[
O(log d)
ǫ
+
O(log(n log2(T)/δ))
ǫ
]
.
Corollary 4. If all players use Strong Low Approximate Regret algorithms then: 1. The above results hold
for all ǫ > 0 simultaneously. 2. Individual players have regret bounded by O(T−1/2), even in adversarial
settings. 3. The players approach a coarse correlated equilibrium asymptotically.
2We can also show that the theorem holds if players satisfy the property for different values of ǫ, but with a
dependence on the worst case value of ǫ across all players.
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Comparisonwith Syrgkanis et al. [SALS15]. By relaxing the standard λ/(1−µ) price of anarchy
bound, Theorem 3 substantially broadens the class of algorithms that experience fast convergence
to include even the common Hedge algorithm. The main result of [SALS15] shows that learning
algorithms that satisfy their RVU property converge to the price of anarchy bound λ/(1− µ) at the
rate of n2 log d/T. They further show how to achieve a worse approximation of λ(1 + µ)/(µ(1 − µ))
at the improved (in terms of n) rate of n log d/T. We converge to an approximation arbitrarily close
to λ/(1 + µ) at a rate of n log d/T. Note that in atomic congestion games with affine congestion
function µ = 1/3, so their bound of λ(1 + µ)/µ(1 − µ) loses a factor of 4 compared to the price of
anarchy.
Strong Low Approximate Regret algorithms such as Hedge with online learning rate tuning
simultaneously experience both fast O(n/T) convergence in games and an O(1/
√
T) bound on
individual regret in adversarial settings. In contrast, [SALS15] only shows O(n/
√
T) individual
regret and O(n3/T) convergence to price of anarchy simultaneously.
Low Approximate Regret algorithms only need realized feedback, whereas [SALS15] require
expectation feedback. Having players receive expectation feedback is unrealistic in terms of both
information and computation. Indeed, even if the necessary informationwas available, computing
expectations over discrete probability distributions is not tractable in the general case unless n is
taken to be constant.
Our results imply that Optimistic Hedge enjoys the best of two worlds: It enjoys fast convergence
to the exact λ/(1−µ) price of anarchy using expectation feedback as well as fast convergence to the
ǫ-approximate price of anarchy using realized feedback. Our new analysis of Optimistic Hedge
(AppendixA.2.2) sheds light on another desirable property of this algorithm: Its regret is bounded
in terms of the net cost incurred by Hedge. Figure 1 summarizes the differences between our
results.
Feedback POA Rate Time comp.
RVU property [SALS15] Expected costs exact O(n2 log d/T) dO(n) per round
LAR property (section 2) Realized costs ǫ-approx O(n log d/(ǫT)) O(d) per round
Figure 1: Comparison of Low Approximate Regret and RVU properties.
4 Bandit Feedback
In many realistic scenarios, the players of a game might not even know what they would have
lost or gained if they had deviated from the action they played. We model this lack of information
with bandit feedback, in which each player observes a single scalar, costi(st) = 〈sti , cti〉, per round.3
When the game considered is smooth, one can use the LowApproximate Regret property as in the
full information setting to show that players quickly converge to efficient outcomes. Our results
here hold with the same generality as in the full information setting: As long as learners satisfy
the Low Approximate Regret property (1), an efficiency result analogous to Proposition 1 holds.
Proposition 5. Consider a (λ, µ)-smooth game. If all players use bandit learning algorithms with Low
3With slight abuse of notation, st
i
denotes the identity vector associated to the strategy player i used at time t.
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Approximate Regret A(d,T) then
1
T
E
∑
t
C(st)
 ≤ λ1 − µ − ǫOpt + nT · 11 − µ − ǫ · A(d,T)ǫ .
Bandit Algorithms with Low Approximate Regret The bandit Low Approximate Regret prop-
erty requires that (1) holds in expectation against any sequence of adaptive and potentially ad-
versarially chosen costs, but only for an obliviously chosen comparator f .4 This is weaker than
requiring that an algorithm achieve a true expected regret bound; it is closer to pseudo-regret.
The Exp3Light algorithm [Sto05] satisfies Low Approximate Regret with A(d,T) = d2 logT. The
SCRiBLe algorithm introduced in [AHR08] (via the analysis in [RS13a]) enjoys the Low Approxi-
mate Regret property with A(d,T) = d3 log(dT). The GREEN algorithm introduced in [AAGO06]
achieves the Low Approximate Regret property with A(d,T) = d log(T), but only works with costs
and not gains. This prevents it from being used in utility settings such as auctions, as in Appendix
D.
We present a new bandit algorithm (Algorithm 3) that achieves Low Approximate Regret with
A(d,T) = d log(T/d) and thus matches the performance of GREEN, but works in both cost mini-
mization and utility maximization settings. This method is based on Online Mirror Descent with
a logarithmic barrier for the positive orthant, but differs from earlier algorithms based on the
logarithmic barrier (e.g. [RS13a]) in that it uses the classical importance-weighted estimator for
costs instead of sampling based on the Dikin elipsoid. It can be implemented in O˜(d) time per
round, using line search to find γ. We provide the proof of this lemma and further discussion of
Algorithm 3 in Appendix B.
Algorithm 3: Initialize w1 to the uniform distribution. On each round t, perform update:
Algorithm 3 update: wt
st−1 =
wt−1
st−1
1 + ηct
st−1 + γw
t−1
st−1
and ∀j , st−1 wtj =
wt−1
j
1 + γwt−1
j
, (3)
where γ ≤ 0 is chosen so that wt is a valid probability distribution.
Lemma 6. Algorithm 3 with η = ǫ/(1 + ǫ) has Low Approximate Regret with A(d,T) = O(d logT).
Comparison to Other Algorithms In contrast to the full information setting where the most
common algorithm, Hedge, achieves Low Approximate Regret with competitive parameters, the
most commonadversarial bandit algorithmExp3does not seem to satisfyLowApproximateRegret.
[AB10] provide a small loss bound for bandits which would be sufficient for Low Approximate
Regret, but their algorithm requires prior knowledge on the loss of the best action (or a bound on
it), which is not appropriate in our game setting. Similarly, the small loss bound in [Neu15] is not
applicable in our setting as the work assumes an oblivious adversary and so does not apply to the
games we consider.
4This is because we only need to evaluate (1) with the game’s optimal solution s⋆ to prove efficiency results.
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5 Dynamic Population Games
In this section we consider the dynamic population repeated game setting introduced in [LST16].
Detailed discussion and all proofs are deferred to Appendix C. Given a game G as described in
Section 2, a dynamic population game with stage game G is a repeated game where at each round
t game G is played and every player i is replaced by a new player with a turnover probability p.
Concretely, when a player turns over, their strategy set and cost function are changed arbitrarily
subject to the rules of the game. This models a repeated game setting where players have to adapt
to an adversarially changing environment. We denote the cost function of player i at round t as
costt
i
(·). As in Section 3, we assume that the players receive full information feedback. At the end
of each round they observe the entire cost vector ct
i
= costt
i
(·, st−i), but are not aware of the costs of
the other players in the game.
Learning in Dynamic Population Games and the Price of Anarchy To guarantee small overall
cost using the smoothness analysis from Section 2, players need to exhibit low regret against a
shifting benchmark s∗t
i
of socially optimal strategies achieving Optt = mins∗t
∑
i cost
t
i
(s∗t). Even
with a small probability p of change, the sequence of optimal solutions can have toomany changes
to be able to achieve low regret. In spite of this apparent difficulty, [LST16] prove that at least a
ρλ/(1 − µ − ǫ) fraction of the optimal welfare is guaranteed if 1. players are using low adaptive
regret algorithms (see [HS09, LS15]) and 2. for the underlying optimization problem there exists
a relatively stable sequence of solutions which at each step approximate the optimal solution by a
factor of ρ. This holds as long as the turnover probability p is upper bounded by a function of ǫ
(and of certain other properties of the game, such as the stability of the close to optimal solution).
We consider dynamic population games where each player uses a learning algorithm satisfying
LowApproximate Regret for shifting experts (2). This shifting version of LowApproximate Regret
implies a dynamic game analog of our main efficiency result, Proposition 1.
Algorithms with Low Approximate Regret for Shifting Experts A simple variant of Hedge we
term Noisy Hedge, which mixes the Hedge update at each round with a small amount of uniform
noise, satisfies the LowApproximate Regret property for shifting expertswithA(d,T) = O(log(dT)).
Moreover, algorithms that satisfy a small loss version of the adaptive regret property [HS09] used
in [LST16] satisfy the Strong Low Approximate Regret property.
Proposition 7. Noisy Hedge with learning rate η = ǫ satisfies the Low Approximate Regret property for
shifting experts with A(d,T) = 2 log(dT).
Extending Proposition 1 to the Dynamic Population Game Setting Let s∗1:T denote a stable
sequence of near-optimal solutions s∗t with
∑
i cost
t
i
(s∗t) ≤ ρ ·Optt for all rounds t. As discussed in
[LST16], such stable sequences can come from simple greedy algorithms (where each change in the
input of one player affects the output of few other players) or via differentially private algorithms
(where each change in the input of one player affects the output of all other players with small
probability); in the latter case the sequence is randomized. For a deterministic sequence s∗1:T
i
of
player i’s actions, we let the random variable Ki denote the number of changes in the sequence. For
a randomized sequence s∗1:T
i
, we let Ki be the sum of total variation distances between subsequent
pairs s∗t−1
i
and s∗t
i
. The stability of a sequence of solutions is determined by E[
∑
i Ki].
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Proposition 8. (PoA with Dynamic Population) If all players use Low Approximate Regret algorithms
satisfying (2) in a dynamic population game, where the stage game is (λ, µ)-smooth, and Ki as defined above
then
1
T
∑
t
E
[
C(st)
]
≤ 1
T
λ · ρ
1 − µ − ǫ
∑
t
E
[
Optt
]
+
n + E
[∑
i Ki
]
T
· 1
1 − µ − ǫ ·
A(d,T)
ǫ
. (4)
Here the expectation is taken over the random turnover in the population playing the game, as well as the
random choices of the players on the left hand side.
To claim a price of anarchy bound, we need to ensure that the additive term in (4) is a small fraction
of the optimal cost. The challenge is that high turnover probability reduces stability, increasing
E
[∑
i Ki
]
. By using algorithms with smaller A(d,T), we can allow for higher E
[∑
i Ki
]
and hence
higher turnover probability. Combining Noisy Hedge with Proposition 8 strengthens the results
in [LST16] by both weakening the behavioral assumption on the players, allowing them to use
simpler learning algorithms, and allowing a higher turnover probability.
Comparison to Previous Results [LST16] use themore complex AdaNormalHedge algorithm of
[LS15] which satisfies the adaptive regret property of [HS09], but has O(dT) space complexity. In
contrast, Noisy Hedge only requires space complexity of just O(d). Moreover, a broader class of
algorithms satisfy the Low Approximate Regret property which makes the efficiency guarantees
more prescriptive since this property serves as a behavioral assumption. Finally, the guarantees
we provide improve on the turnover probability that can be accommodated. We provide further
discussion in Appendix C.1.
Acknowledgements We thank Vasilis Syrgkanis for sharing simulation software and the NIPS
reviewers for pointing out that the GREEN algorithm [AAGO06] satisfies the Low Approximate
Regret property.
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APPENDIX
A Supplementary material for Section 3
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Overview The core of Proposition 2 is Lemma 9, which shows that the regret of an individual
player concentrates around its expectation. To prove the high probability efficiency result of
Proposition 2 we simply apply this lemma to the individual players, apply the union bound to get
a regret statement that holds for all players simultaneously, thenfinally apply the same smoothness
argument used in the expectation case.
Lemma 9 (High-probability regret bound). Let wt ∈ ∆(d) be selected by an algorithm satisfying the Low
Approximate Regret property (1) for ǫ > 0 given costs ct selected by an adaptive adversary, and let st ∼ wt
be the algorithm’s realized action. Then for all δ ∈ (0,min{1, n log 2T/e}) and T ≥ 4, with probability at
least 1 − δ,
(1 − γ)
T∑
t=1
〈st, ct〉 ≤
T∑
t=1
〈
s⋆, ct
〉
+
4A(d,T)
γ
+
12 log(log2(T)/δ)
γ
, (5)
where ǫ = γ/(2 − γ).
Before proving Lemma 9 we restate a refinement of Freedman’s martingale Bernstein inequality
due to [BDH+08] which is a standard tool for proving high-probability versions of data-dependent
regret bounds.
Lemma 10 ([BDH+08]). Let X1, . . . ,XT be a martingale difference sequence with |Xt| ≤ b. Let σ¯2 =∑T
t=1 Var(Xt | X1, . . . ,Xt−1) be the sum of conditional variances for a particular outcome X1, . . . ,XT. For
all δ ∈ (0, 1/e), T ≥ 4 we have
P

T∑
t=1
Xt > 4
√
σ¯2 log(1/δ) + 2b log(1/δ)
 ≤ log2(T)δ. (6)
Proof of Lemma 9. Let Zt(s1, . . . , st) = (1 − ǫ)〈st, ct〉 be a random process indexed by t ∈ [T]. We
leave thedependenceof ct on s1, . . . , st−1 implicit. LetXt(s1, . . . , st) = Zt(s1, . . . , st)−E
[
Zt | s1, . . . , st−1
]
be the associated martingale difference sequence. Note that |Xt| ≤ (1 − ǫ) ≤ 1 and that E[st |
s1, . . . , st−1] = wt.
Lemma 10 applied to
∑T
t=1 X
t(s1, . . . , st) and the Low Approximate Regret property (1) now imply
that for a given draw of s1, . . . , sT, with probability at least 1 − δ,
(1 − ǫ)
T∑
t=1
〈st, ct〉 =
T∑
t=1
Zt ≤
T∑
t=1
E
[
Zt | s1, . . . , st−1
]
+ 4
√
σ¯2 log(log2(T)/δ) + 2 log(log2(T)/δ)
= (1 − ǫ)
T∑
t=1
〈
wt, ct
〉
+ 4
√
σ¯2 log(log2(T)/δ) + 2 log(log2(T)/δ)
≤
T∑
t=1
〈
s⋆, ct
〉
+
A(d,T)
ǫ
+ 4
√
σ¯2 log(log2(T)/δ) + 2 log(log2(T)/δ),
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where s⋆ = argmini∈[d]
∑T
t=1
〈
ei, c
t
〉
. To complete this bound we must provide a bound on the
conditional variance σ¯2. To this end note that
σ¯2 =
T∑
t=1
E
[(
Xts
)2 | s1, . . . , st−1]
= (1 − ǫ)2
T∑
t=1
E
[(
〈st, ct〉 − 〈wt, ct〉
)2 | s1, . . . , st−1].
Now, since the mean minimizes the squared error:
≤ (1 − ǫ)2
T∑
t=1
E
[(
〈st, ct〉
)2 | s1, . . . , st−1].
Since ct ∈ [0, 1]d we have
σ¯2 ≤ (1 − ǫ)2
T∑
t=1
E
[
〈st, ct〉 | s1, . . . , st−1
]
= (1 − ǫ)2
T∑
t=1
〈wt, ct〉.
Hence, with probability at least 1 − δ,
(1 − ǫ)
T∑
t=1
〈st, ct〉 −
T∑
t=1
〈
s⋆, ct
〉
≤ A(d,T)
ǫ
+ 4
√√
(1 − ǫ)2

T∑
t=1
〈wt, ct〉
 log(log2(T)/δ) + 2 log(log2(T)/δ).
Now for all ǫ′ > 0 by the AM-GM inequality we have:
≤ A(d,T)
ǫ
+ ǫ′(1 − ǫ)2

T∑
t=1
〈wt, ct〉
 + 4 log(log2(T)/δ)/ǫ′ + 2 log(log2(T)/δ),
and so the Low Approximate Regret property (1) implies
≤ A(d,T)
ǫ
+ ǫ′(1 − ǫ)

T∑
t=1
〈
s⋆, ct
〉
+
A(d,T)
ǫ
 + 4 log(log2(T)/δ)/ǫ′ + 2 log(log2(T)/δ).
Rearranging,
(1 − ǫ)
(1 + ǫ′(1 − ǫ))
T∑
t=1
〈st, ct〉
≤
T∑
t=1
〈
s⋆, ct
〉
+
1
1 + ǫ′(1 − ǫ)
[
A(d,T)
ǫ
+ 4 log
(
log2(T)/δ
)
/ǫ′ + 2 log
(
log2(T)/δ
)]
+
A(d,T)
ǫ
.
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Taking ǫ′ = ǫwe have
(1 − ǫ)
1 + ǫ − ǫ2
T∑
t=1
〈st, ct〉 ≤
T∑
t=1
〈
s⋆, ct
〉
+ 2
A(d,T)
ǫ
+
6 log(log2(T)/δ)
ǫ
.
We simplify to a slightly weaker bound,
(1 − ǫ)
(1 + ǫ)
T∑
t=1
〈st, ct〉 ≤
T∑
t=1
〈
s⋆, ct
〉
+ 2
A(d,T)
ǫ
+
6 log(log2(T)/δ)
ǫ
.
Now setting ǫ = γ/(1 − γ) we arrive at
(1 − 2γ)
T∑
t=1
〈st, ct〉 ≤
T∑
t=1
〈
s⋆, ct
〉
+ 2
A(d,T)
γ
+
6 log(log2(T)/δ)
γ
.
Finally, reparameterizing with γ′ = 2γ we have
(1 − γ′)
T∑
t=1
〈st, ct〉 ≤
T∑
t=1
〈
s⋆, ct
〉
+
4A(d,T)
γ′
+
12 log(log2(T)/δ)
γ′
.

A.2 Low Approximate Property for Specific Algorithms
In this section, we present the proofs of the LowApproximate Regret property forHedge (Example
1) and Optimistic Hedge (Example 3). The first proof is only included for completeness but may
be helpful as subsequent proofs follow the same framework. Our proof for Optimistic Hedge
includes a new analysis that relates the performance of Optimistic Hedge on a given cost sequence
to the performance ofHedge on the same sequence. The analysis shows that Optimistic Hedgewill
experience low regret whenever Hedge has low cost, which in particular implies that it satisfies
the Low Approximate Regret property. We omit the proof for Example 2 and instead refer the
reader to Corollary 2.4 of [CBL06], which derives the result using the doubling trick.
A.2.1 Hedge (Example 1)
Hedge is an algorithm for online linear optimization over the simplex ∆(d). It has update rule
wt+1i ∝ wtie−ηc
t
i ∀i ∈ [d],
where η > 0 is the learning rate.
We derive Hedge as an instance of Online Mirror Descent (see e.g. [Haz16]) with the negative
entropy regularizer R(w) =
∑d
i=1 wi log(wi). To run Online Mirror Descent one picks a learning rate
η > 0 and initial weights (also known as a prior) w1, then performs the following update step at
each time t ∈ [T]:
1. Let w˜t satisfy ∇R(w˜t+1) = ∇R(wt) − ηct.
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2. wt+1 = argmin f∈∆(d) DR( f |w˜t+1).
Here DR( f |1) , R( f ) − R(1) −
〈∇R(1), f − 1〉 is the Bregman divergence for the regularizer R. We
briefly restate some useful properties of the Mirror Descent update.
Lemma 11 (Properties of Mirror Descent (e.g. [Haz16])). For any convex regularizer R we have
• DR( f | 1) ≥ 0.
• For any a, b, c ∈ ∆(d),
〈b − a,∇R(c) − ∇R(b)〉 = DR(a | c) −DR(a | b) −DR(b | c).
• The Mirror Descent update can alternatively be expressed as
wt+1 = argmin
f∈∆(d)
η〈 f, ct〉 +DR
(
f | wt
)
.
• Any update of the form f ∗ = argmin f∈∆(d)
〈
f, c
〉
+DR
(
f | w) satisfies
〈
f ∗ − 1, c〉 ≤ DR(1 | w) −DR(1 | f ∗) −DR( f ∗ | w) ∀1 ∈ ∆(d).
Proposition 12. Hedge, when run with constant learning rate and uniform prior w1
i
= 1/d, satisfies the
Low Approximate Regret property with A(d,T) = log(d).
Proof of Proposition 12. Using the standard OnlineMirror Descent analysis we have that at every
step t, for any f ∈ ∆(d):
〈wt − f, ct〉 ≤ 〈wt − w˜t+1, ct〉 + 1
η
(
DR( f |wt) −DR( f |wt+1) −DR(w˜t+1|wt)
)
≤ 〈wt − w˜t+1, ct〉 + 1
η
(
DR( f |wt) −DR( f |wt+1)
)
. (7)
For the first term in the sum above, we have:
〈wt − w˜t+1, ct〉 ≤ η〈wt, ct〉 (8)
To see this note that ∇R(w) = log(w)+ 1 (where log is applied element-wise) and hence (∇R)−1( f ) =
e f−1. This implies w˜t+1
i
= wt
i
e−ηc
t
i , and so
〈wt − w˜t+1, ct〉 =
∑
j∈[d]
wtjc
t
j(1 − e
−ηct
j ) ≤ η
∑
j∈[d]
wtj(c
t
j)
2 ≤ η〈wt, ct〉. (9)
The first inequality in (9) uses that 1 − e−ηx ≤ ηx for x > 0 and the second inequality uses that the
losses lie in [0, 1].
Using relations (7) and (8), and summing over t:
∑
t
〈wt − f, ct〉 ≤ η
∑
t
〈wt, ct〉 + 1
η
DR( f |w1). (10)
Since w1 is the uniform distribution, DR( f |w1) ≤ log(d). Rearranging yields the claimed result. 
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A.2.2 Optimistic Hedge (Example 3)
TheOptimisticHedge algorithmperforms two separateweight updates at each timestep toproduce
its action distribution. The method first performs a Hedge update 1t+1
i
∝ 1t
i
e−ηc
t
i , then produces the
prediction distribution: wt+1
i
∝ 1t+1
i
e−ηc
t
i .
Lemma 13. Optimistic Hedge with a constant learning rate η = ǫ/8 < 1/4 satisfies the Low Approximate
Regret property with A(d,T) = 8 log(d).
Let R be the negative entropy regularizer as in the proof of Proposition 12. Let ∇2R(w) denote
the Hessian of the regularizer R. The local norm with respect to w is ‖ f ‖w =
√
fT∇2R(w) f and its
dual norm is ‖x‖⋆w =
√
xT(∇2R(w))−1x. For the negative entropy regularizer this definition yields
‖ f ‖2w =
∑
i∈[d]
( fi)2
wi
and (‖x‖⋆w)2 =
∑
i∈[d] wi(xi)2. We begin by restating an intermediate Lemma from
[RS13a] that bounds the regret of Optimistic Hedge in terms of the local norm.
Lemma 14. (Lemma 3 in [RS13a]) Optimistic Hedge enjoys for any f ∈ ∆(S)
T∑
t=1
〈wt − f, ct〉 ≤ 2η
T∑
t=1
(‖ct − ct−1‖⋆
wt
)2 +
log(d)
η
. (11)
as long as η‖ct − ct−1‖∞ ≤ 1/4 at every step.
Proof of Lemma 13. We will focus on the first term in the right-hand side of (11) and prove that
for all t,
(‖ct − ct−1‖⋆
wt
)2 ≤ 2〈wt, ct〉 + 2〈1t−1, ct−1〉. (12)
This holds as
(‖ct − ct−1‖⋆
wt
)2 ≤ 2
(
(‖ct‖⋆
wt
)2 + (‖ct−1‖⋆
wt
)2
)
= 2
( d∑
j=1
wtj(c
t
j)
2 +
d∑
j=1
wtj(c
t−1
j )
2)
)
(13)
≤ 2
(
〈wt, ct〉 + 〈wt, ct−1〉
)
(14)
= 2
(
〈wt, ct〉 + 〈1t−1, ct−1〉 + 〈wt − 1t, ct−1〉 + 〈1t − 1t−1, ct−1〉
)
≤ 2
(
〈wt, ct〉 + 〈1t−1, ct−1〉
)
. (15)
Here (13) holds by the definition of the local norm, (14) holds as the costs are in [0, 1], and (15)
holds via two applications of Lemma 11 for Bregman projections:
〈wt − 1t, ct−1〉 ≤ DR(1t | 1t) −DR(1t | wt) −DR(wt | 1t) ≤ 0.
〈1t − 1t−1, ct−1〉 ≤ DR(1t−1 | 1t−1) −DR(1t−1 | 1t) −DR(1t | 1t−1) ≤ 0.
Now, applying (12) to Lemma 14, we have that for η < 1/4,
T∑
t=1
〈wt − f, ct〉 ≤ 4η
T∑
t=1
〈wt, ct〉 + 4η
T∑
t=1
〈1t−1, ct−1〉 + log(d)
η
. (16)
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Observe now that 1t are the weights selected by the basic Hedge algorithm on the sequence {ct}
(setting c0 = 0 and 10 uniform). Hence by the Low Approximate Regret property for Hedge
(Example 1) we have
T∑
t=1
〈wt − f, ct〉 ≤ 4η
T∑
t=1
〈wt, ct〉 + 4η
1 − η
( T∑
t=1
〈 f, ct−1〉 + log(d)
η
)
+
log(d)
η
.
Rearranging,
(1 − 4η)
T∑
t=1
〈wt, ct〉 ≤ 1 + 3η
1 − η
( T∑
t=1
〈 f, ct〉 + log(d)
η
)
.
This gives the claimed bound as 1 + 3η ≤ 11−3η for η ≤ 1/3 and 1 − 8η ≤ (1 − 4η)(1 − η)(1 − 3η). 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 follows immediately from Propositions 1 and 2.
Corrollary 4 holds because the Strong Low Approximate Regret property states that (1) holds for
all ǫ > 0, so in particular we can set ǫ =
√
log(d)
T to arrive at the desired regret bound.
B Supplementary material for Section 4
B.1 Proof of Lemma 6
Algorithm3 follows a standarddesign scheme for bandit algorithms. Firstwedevelop analgorithm
with a full information regret bound, then run this algorithm using an unbiased estimator for the
cost.
LetR(w) =
∑
j∈[d] log(1/w j); we call this the log barrier regularizer because it is a logarithmic barrier
for the positive orthant. Algorithm 3 is equivalent to the following update step at each time t:
• Sample st ∼ wt.
• Observe ct
st
and build the importance-weighted estimator:
cˆtj =
c
t
j
/wt
j
if j = st
0 otherwise
.
• Update wt+1 with a Mirror Descent step from cˆt:
1. Let w˜t satisfy ∇R(w˜t+1) = ∇R(wt) − ηcˆt.
2. wt+1 = argmin f∈∆(d) DR( f |w˜t+1).
Note that cˆt is unbiased in that it satisfies Est∼wt
[
cˆt
]
= ct.
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Overview In this section we state and prove Lemma 17, which provides a regret bound for
Algorithm 3. To prove Lemma 6, we apply Lemma 17 with learning rate η = ǫ/(1 + ǫ) and observe
that the Low Approximate Regret property is satisfied:
(1 − ǫ)E
∑
t
〈est , ct〉
 ≤ ∑
t
〈 f, ct〉 + d(1 + ǫ) log(T/d)
ǫ
+ d.
In Appendix D we sketch a proof of the regret bound for Algorithm 3 in the case where utilities
are used instead of costs.
Regret Bound for Full Information
Proposition 15 (Properties of the log barrier regularizer). Recall that R(w) =
∑
i∈[d] log(1/wi).
• ∇R(w) = −1/w, which implies that for all i: w˜t+1
i
=
wt
i
1+ηwt
i
cˆt
i
.
• DR( f | w) =
∑
i∈[d]
[
log
(
wi
fi
)
+
fi
wi
]
− d.
Lemma 16. Online Mirror Descent (see section A.2.1) with the log barrier regularizer, for any sequence of
costs c1, . . . , cT in Rd, produces weights wt that satisfy the following bound for any f⋆ ∈ ∆(d):
〈wt − f⋆, ct〉 ≤ η
∑
j∈[d]
(wt
j
· ct
j
)2
1 + ηwt
j
ct
j
+
1
η
(
DR
(
f⋆ | wt
)
−DR
(
f | wt+1
))
. (17)
In particular, it achieves the regret bound
T∑
t=1
〈wt − f⋆, ct〉 ≤ η
T∑
t=1
∑
j∈[d]
(wt
j
· ct
j
)2
1 + ηwt
j
ct
j
+
1
η
DR
(
f⋆ | w1
)
. (18)
Proof of Lemma 16. Fix f⋆ ∈ ∆(d). Starting from the standard Mirror Descent proof we have that
for each t:
〈wt − f⋆, cˆt〉 ≤ 〈wt − w˜t+1, cˆt〉 + 1
η
(
DR
(
f⋆ | wt
)
−DR
(
f⋆ | wt+1
))
.
The result is obtained by plugging in the expression for w˜t from Proposition 15:
= η
∑
j
(wt
j
cˆt
j
)2
1 + ηwt
j
cˆt
j
+
1
η
(
DR
(
f⋆ | wt
)
−DR
(
f⋆ | wt+1
))
.
The regret bound is obtained by summing this inequality. 
From Full Information to Partial Information
Lemma 17 (Regret bound for Algorithm 3). For any f⋆ ∈ ∆(d), and any sequence of costs c1, . . . , cT ∈
[0, 1]d, the weights generated by Algorithm 3 with η ∈ (0, 1) satisfy
E

T∑
t=1
〈wt − f⋆, ct〉
 ≤ η1 − η E

T∑
t=1
〈wt, ct〉
 + 1ηd log(T/d) + d. (19)
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Proof of Lemma 17. Observe that Algorithm 3 is equivalent to running Online Mirror Descent
with R, using the unbiased estimator cˆt for costs, where we recall cˆt
i
= 1
{
st = i
}
ct
i
/wt
i
. Thus, Lemma
16 implies that at each time t,
〈wt − f⋆, cˆt〉 ≤ η
∑
j∈[d]
(wt
j
· cˆt
j
)2
1 + ηwt
j
cˆt
j
+
1
η
(
DR
(
f⋆ | wt
)
−DR
(
f⋆ | wt+1
))
.
Since wt
j
cˆt
j
= 1
{
st = j
}
ct
j
, we have:
= η
∑
j∈[d]
1{st = j}
(ct
j
)2
1 + ηct
j
+
1
η
(
DR
(
f⋆ | wt
)
−DR
(
f⋆ | wt+1
))
Taking the conditional expectation of each side of this inequality we have
〈wt − f⋆, ct〉 = E
[
〈wt − f⋆, cˆt〉 | s1, . . . , st−1
]
≤ E
η
∑
j∈[d]
1{st = j}
(ct
j
)2
1 + ηct
j
| s1, . . . , st−1
 + 1η
(
DR
(
f⋆ | wt
)
−DR
(
f⋆ | wt+1
))
= η
∑
j∈[d]
wt
j
(ct
j
)2
1 + ηct
j
+
1
η
(
DR
(
f⋆ | wt
)
−DR
(
f⋆ | wt+1
))
.
Now, since ct
j
lie in the range [0, 1] we have
≤ η
1 − η
〈
wt, ct
〉
+
1
η
(
DR
(
f⋆ | wt
)
−DR
(
f⋆ | wt+1
))
.
Summing over all t and taking a final expectation yields the bound,
E

T∑
t=1
〈wt − f⋆, ct〉
 ≤ η1 − η E

T∑
t=1
〈wt, ct〉
 + 1ηDR
(
f⋆ | w1
)
. (20)
It remains to bound the Bregman divergence term. A direct approach fails here because one can
choose f⋆ to makeDR( f⋆ | w1) arbitrarily large; this is in contrast with the case whereDR is the KL
divergence, where we have a log d bound as long asw1 is uniform. To sidestep this difficulty, given
arbitrary f⋆ ∈ ∆(d) we let f¯ = (1 − θ) f⋆ + θπ, where θ ∈ [0, 1] and π is the uniform distribution.
By Proposition 15 we have
DR
(
f¯ | w1
)
≤ d log(1/θ) (21)
Applying (20) with f¯ as the comparator now implies
E

T∑
t=1
〈wt − f¯ , ct〉
 ≤ η1 − η E

T∑
t=1
〈wt, ct〉
 + 1ηd log(1/θ).
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Rearranging, this implies
E

T∑
t=1
〈wt − f⋆, ct〉
 ≤ η1 − η E

T∑
t=1
〈wt, ct〉
 + θ
T∑
t=1
〈
π, ct
〉
+
1
η
d log(1/θ).
Since we have assumed ct ∈ [0, 1]d, this is bounded as
≤ η
1 − η E

T∑
t=1
〈wt, ct〉
 + θT + 1ηd log(1/θ).
Finally, setting θ = d/T yields the desired bound:
≤ η
1 − η E

T∑
t=1
〈wt, ct〉
 + 1ηd log(T/d) + d.

C Supplementary Material for Section 5
C.1 Discussion of Results for Dynamic Population Games
We briefly show how Proposition 8 with players using Low Approximate Regret algorithms with
A(d,T) = O(log(dT)) improves the maximum turnover rate p in the results of [LST16].
In Definition 1, Low Approximate Regret for shifting experts (2) is defined in terms of the number
of shifts K = |{i > 2 : f t−1 , f t}| in a sequence of comparators f 1, . . . , fT. To compare with [LST16]
we need a slightly different notion of Low Approximate Regret based on the total variation distance
of the sequence f 1, . . . , fT. Letting K =
∑
t
∥∥∥ f t − f t−1∥∥∥
1
, we require
(1 − ǫ)
T∑
t=1
〈wti , cti〉 ≤
T∑
t=1
〈 f t, cti〉 + (1 + K)
A(d,T)
ǫ
. (22)
In fact, whenever Low Approximate Regret for shifting experts (2) holds, (22) holds as well as
explained in [LST16]. Thus, without loss of generality we take Ki to be the total variation distance
of the solution sequence s∗1:T
i
for the ith player going forward, since if player i satisfies Low
Approximate Regret for shifting experts (2) they also satisfy:
(1 − ǫ)
T∑
t=1
〈wti , cti〉 ≤
T∑
t=1
〈s∗ti , cti〉 + (1 +
T∑
t=2
‖s∗ti − s∗t−1i ‖1)
A(d,T)
ǫ
. (23)
Let κ denote the expected number of players whose strategy in s∗1:T changes as one player turns
over, so E
[∑
i Ki
]
= pnTκ (as in expectation pn players turn over at each step). The parameter κ
as defined here depends on the concrete game; it is a parameter of a high stability approximate
optimization method used as in [LST16]. Let γ > 0 be a lower bound on the minimum cost of each
player, at each time step, so that we have
∑
t E
[
Optt
]
≥ γnT. Using the two parameters κ and γ,
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[LST16] showaprice of anarchyboundofλρ/(1−µ−ǫ), assuming the turnoverprobability p satsifies
p ≤ ǫ2γ2/(κ log(dT)). Using Proposition 8 with with A(d,T) = O(log(dT)) (as in, for example, Noisy
Hedge) we get the same price of anarchy bound, yet allow higher turnover probability by a factor
of 1/γ: We tolerate p ≤ ǫ2γ/(κ log(dT)).
To illustrate this improvement, consider matching markets. Suppose n players are each bidding
in a first price item auction for one of many items (i.e., the winner pays her own bid for each
item). Further suppose vi j, the player i’s value for item j, has vi j ∈ [γ, 1], and that the players are
unit-demand, each bidding with the goal of winning one high value item at a low price. In this
mechanism, we will use SW(s) to denote the social welfare achieved by action profile s, the sum of
player utilities plus the auctioneer’s revenue, and use Optt is the maximum social welfare possible
with players in round t.
The first price item auction is a (1 − 1/e, 1) smooth mechanism and hence has a price of anarchy of
e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.58. Lykouris et al. [LST16] prove that a price of anarchy of 3.16(1 + ǫ) is guaranteed if
players use adaptive learning and the turnover probability is at most p ≤ ǫ2γ2/(log(dT) log(1/γ)),
which corresponds to ρ = 2 and κ = log(1/γ). Using the proof from [LST16] with the improved
A(d,T) term of Proposition 7, we get an γ−1 improvement in the probability term.
Theorem 18. If all players use Low Approximate Regret algorithms for shifting experts with parameters η
and A(d,T) = log(dT) in a dynamic population matching market with first price item auctions, then
3.16(1+ η)
∑
t
E
[
SW(st)
]
≥
∑
t
E
[
Optt
]
, (24)
assuming the turnover probability p has at most p ≤ ǫ2γ/(log(dT) log(1/γ)).
In other games and mechanisms [LST16] including congestion games, bandwidth-sharing, and
large markets, we achieve analogous improvements.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 7
Noisy Hedge is a modification of Hedge that mixes the distribution returned by the exponential
update with a small uniform noise at each step. Fix θ ∈ [0, 1], η > 0, and let π be the uniform
distribution over [d]. Let w1 = π. Then the Noisy Hedge update at time t is given by:
1. w˜t+1
i
= wt
i
e−ηc
t
i .
2. 1t+1
i
= w˜t+1
i
/
∑
j∈[d] w˜t+1j .
3. wt+1 = (1 − θ)1t+1 + θπ.
Lemma 19. Let f 1, . . . , fT ∈ ∆(d) be any sequence of experts with K changes. Then for any sequence of
costs c1, . . . , cT ∈ [0, 1]d, Noisy Hedge with learning rate η > 0 and θ = 1/T enjoys the regret bound
T∑
t=1
〈wt − f t, ct〉 ≤ η
T∑
t=1
〈wt, ct〉 + 1
η
(
2 log d + K log(dT)
)
.
Proof of Lemma 19. We follow a proof similar to that of Hedge (Proposition 12). Note that we
have
〈wt − f t, ct〉 = 〈wt − w˜t+1, ct〉 + 〈w˜t+1 − f t, ct〉. (25)
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For the first term we may reuse the following bound from the proof of Proposition 12:
〈wt − w˜t+1, ct〉 ≤ η〈wt, ct〉. (26)
For the second term, as in Proposition 12, we use the inequality:
〈w˜t+1 − f t, ct〉 = 1
η
(
DR( f t | wt) −DR( f t | w˜t+1) −DR(w˜t+1 | wt)
)
≤ 1
η
(
DR( f t|wt) −DR( f t|1t+1)
)
,
where the Bregman divergence is the KL divergence, i.e. DR( f |1) =
∑
j f j log( f j/1 j). Summing over
all t, we have:
T∑
t=1
〈wt − f t, ct〉 ≤ η
T∑
t=1
〈wt, ct〉 + 1
η
T∑
t=1
(
DR( f t|wt) −DR( f t|1t+1)
)
(27)
To bound the second term, we distinguish between three cases. First, the term DR( f 1|w1) can be
bounded as in Proposition 12 by log(d) since w1 is the uniform distribution.
Second, at some t > 1 where a change in the comparator occurred ( f t , f t−1), we can bound
DR( f t|wt) by log(d/θ) since wt has is at least θ/d due to the mixing of the noise. This is exactly the
reason why we need the noise — this term could be unbounded otherwise.
Last, for some t > 1 when the comparator did not change ( f t = f t−1), we bound DR( f t|wt) −
DR( f t−1 |1t) by θ ·d. To prove that, note that since without loss of generality f t is an indicator vector,
there is only one summand we are interested in the Bregman divergence. Let’s call this summand
j. What we want to bound is hence
DR( f t|wt) −DR( f t−1|1t) = log(1/wtj) − log(1/1tj) = log(1tj/wtj).
As a result:
T∑
t=1
(
DR( f t|wt) −DR( f t|1t+1
)
≤ log(d) + Tθ log(d) + K log(d/θ). (28)
Combining inequalities 26 and 28 and setting θ = 1/T, the result follows. 
C.3 Proof of Proposition 8
The proof of Proposition 8 is analogous to that of Proposition 1.
Recall that s∗1:T is a solution sequence with cost at most ρ times the minimum cost that is relatively
stable to the turnover of players and that this sequence can be randomized.
For such a sequence of solutions, we use Ki to denote the sum of total variation distances Ki =
23
∑
t
∥∥∥s∗t
i
− s∗t−1
i
∥∥∥
1
of the strategy for player i in this sequence.
(1 − ǫ)
T∑
t=1
E
[
C(st)
]
= (1 − ǫ)
∑
i∈[d]
T∑
t=1
E
[
costi(st)
]
≤
∑
i∈[d]

T∑
t=1
E
[
costi(s∗ti , s
t
−i)
]
+
1 + E[Ki]
ǫ
A(d,T)

≤
T∑
t=1
(λE
[
C(s∗t)
]
+ µE
[
C(st)
]
) +
n + E
[∑
i Ki
]
ǫ
A(d,T).
Here we are taking expectation over the randomness in s∗1:T
i
due to players turning and/or due to
randomness in the approximate minimization algorithm. The first inequality holds because each
player satisfies the Low Approximate Regret property (22) for total variation distance, applied
with s∗1:T
i
as the comparator sequence. As was discussed in Appendix C.1, the property (22) is
implied by Low Approximate Regret for shifting experts (2). The second inequality follows from
smoothness.
The claimed bound follows by rearranging terms. 
D Utility Maximization Games and Mechanisms
In this section, we showhow all our results extend to utility maximization games andmechanisms.
Consider a static game G among a set of n players. Each player i has an action space Si and
a utility function utilityi : S1 × · · · × Sn → [0, 1] that maps an action profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) to a
utility utilityi(s). The goal of each player is to maximize their utility. One can simply adapt our
definitions of Low Approximate Regret by treating utilities as negative costs. While one might
imagine applying the same strategy to adapt algorithms to the utility setting, extra care is required.
Not all algorithms necessarily admit such a direct adaptation (or adapt at all). However, all the
algorithms analyzed in this paper do, and their proofs are designed to carry through with this
adaptation. We demonstrate this by sketching the proofs for Hedge and Algorithm 3 of Low
Approximate Regret with utilities, but the same holds for all the other algorithms we analyze.
As in the cost minimization setting, we assume that at each round t, player i picks a probability
distributionwt
i
and draws her action st
i
from this distribution. The utility she receiveswhen playing
action x is ut
i,x
= utilityi(x, s
t
−i) where s
t
−i is the set of strategies of all but i
th player. Let ut
i
= (ut
i,x
)x∈Si .
An important class of utility maximization games are mechanisms, such as auctions, wheremoney
plays special role. The players’ actions si typically involve bidding on items, and the outcome
of an action profile s comes in two parts: vi : S1 × · · · × Sn → [0, 1], which is the resulting value
for player i, and pi : S1 × · · · × Sn → [0, 1], which is the price player i has to pay. Her utility is
then utilityi(s) = vi(s) − pi(s).5. We evaluate such mechanisms via the notion of social welfare
SW(s) =
∑
i vi(s), the sum of the utilities of the players plus all the payments; this is the revenue
of the mechanism. A simple example of such a mechanism is the first price auction: The player’s
strategy is a bid, and the highest bidder wins the item and pays her own bid.
5We assume that all s have vi(s) − pi(s) ≥ 0.
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We use the the smooth mechanism definition of [ST13].6
Definition 3 (Smooth mechanism [ST13]). A utility maximization mechanism is called (λ, µ)-smooth
if there exists a strategy profile s⋆, such that for all strategy profiles s:
∑
i ui(s
⋆
i
, s−i) ≥ λOpt − µ
∑
i pi(s),
where Opt = maxso
∑n
i=1 utilityi(s
o).
Note the slight difference from Definition 2. In proving the price of anarchy property we used
the game’s smoothness property with s∗ as the action profile resulting in Opt total cost. In the
definition for mechanisms, we do not insist that SW(s∗) = Opt.
Recall from section 2 that first price item auctions are (1 − 1/e, 1)-smooth and all-pay actions are
(1/2, 1)-smooth. We show in Proposition 20 that smooth mechanisms have a price of anarchy of at
most max(µ, 1)/λ.
Definition 4 (Low Approximate Regret for utility maximization). A learning algorithm for player i
that uses action distributions wt
i
in step t satisfies the Low Approximate Regret property for a parameter ǫ,
and a function A(d,T) if for all action distributions f ∈ ∆(Si):
(1 + ǫ)
T∑
t=1
〈wti , uti〉 ≥
T∑
t=1
〈 f, uti〉 −
A(d,T)
ǫ
. (29)
Analgorithm satisfies LowApproximateRegret for the shifting experts setting if for all sequences f 1 , . . . , fT ∈
∆(Si), letting K be the number of shifts, i.e. K = |{t > 2 : f t−1 , f t}|:
(1 + ǫ)
T∑
t=1
〈wti , uti〉 ≥
T∑
t=1
〈 f t, uti〉 − (1 + K)
A(d,T)
ǫ
. (30)
We say that an algorithm satisfies the Strong Low Approximate Regret property if it satisfies (29) or (30) for
all ǫ > 0 simultaneously. In the bandit feedback case, we require the property to hold in expectations over
the realized strategies of player i.
Now we are ready to prove the utility maximization analog of Proposition 1
Proposition 20 (Efficiency for Mechanisms). Consider a (λ, µ)-smooth mechanism. If all players use
Low Approximate Regret algorithms satisfying Eq. (29) for parameter ǫ, then
1
T
∑
t
E
[
SW(st)
]
≥ λ
max(µ, 1 + ǫ)
Opt +
n
T
· 1
max(µ, 1 + ǫ)
· A(d,T)
ǫ
.
where st is the action profile drawn on round t from the corresponding mixed actions of the players.
Proof. We get the claimed bound by considering (1+ ǫ)
∑
t E
[∑
i utilityi(s
t)
]
, using the low approx-
imate regret property with f = s⋆
i
for each player i for the action s⋆in the smoothness property,
then using the smoothness property for each time t to bound
∑
i utilityi(s
⋆
i
, st−i), and rearranging
terms. 
Proposition 21. Hedge with a constant learning rate and uniform prior over actions satisfies the utility
version of the Low Approximate Regret property with A(d,T) = (e − 1) log(d).
6For the dynamic population game setting we use a variant of this definition, solution-based smoothness, where Opt
in the RHS is replaced by the social welfare of a near-optimal solution as in [LST16].
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We mirror the proof of Proposition 12 with ct = −ut. The only place where the analysis does
not automatically go through is where we need that the costs are in [0, 1], namely equation (9).
Note that the first inequality there ceases to hold when ct < 0. However it is still the case that
1 − e−ηx ≤ (e − 1)ηx for x ∈ [−1, 0]. Hence we have:
〈wt − w˜t+1, ct〉 ≤ η(e − 1)
∑
j∈[d]
wtj(c
t
j)
2 ≤ η(e − 1)
∑
j∈[d]
wtj(−ctj).
The last inequality holds as −ct
j
∈ [0, 1].
With this inequality, combined with the rest of the proof in Proposition 12, we have:
∑
t〈wt− f, ct〉 ≤
η(e − 1)∑t〈wt,−ct〉 + log(d)η . Setting ǫ = η(e − 1) and substituting ct yields
(1 + ǫ)
T∑
t=1
〈wt, ut〉 ≥
T∑
t=1
〈 f, ut〉 − (e − 1) log(d)
ǫ
.
which proves the claim.
Bandit Feedback We now provide some more discussion regarding Algorithm 3, since the im-
provement on the number of strategies occurs in utlility maximization settings.
The algorithm’s update step for utilities is obtained by using ct = −ut, but note that the normaliza-
tion factor is γ ≥ 0 for utility settings.
The Low Approximate Regret proof is achieved as in Lemma 6 again by replacing cost with
negative utility.
Lemma 22 (Regret bound for Algorithm 3 with utilities). For any f⋆ ∈ ∆(d), and any sequence of
utilities u1, . . . , uT ∈ [0, 1]d, the weights generated by Algorithm 3 with η ∈ (0, 1) satisfy
E

T∑
t=1
〈wt, ut〉
 ≥ E

T∑
t=1
〈 f⋆, ut〉
 − η1 − η E

T∑
t=1
〈wt, ut〉
 − 1ηd log(T/d) − d. (31)
Proof of Lemma 22. Define a cost sequence c1, . . . , cT via ct = −ut and run Algorithm 3 with these
costs. From Lemma 16, we have that for each t,
−〈wt − f⋆, uˆt〉 ≤ η
∑
j∈[d]
(wt
j
· uˆt
j
)2
1 + ηwt
j
uˆt
j
+
1
η
(
DR
(
f⋆ | wt
)
−DR
(
f | wt+1
))
,
where uˆt
j
= 1
{
j = st
}
ut
j
/wt
j
. Applying an analysis identical to that of Lemma 17 on this bound yields
the result. 
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